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Abstract. An election is a process through which citizens in liberal
democracies select their governing bodies, usually through voting. For
elections to be truly honest, people must be able to vote freely without
being subject to coercion; that is why voting is usually done in a private
manner. In this paper we analyze the security offered by a paper-ballot
voting system that is used in Israel, as well as several other countries
around the world. we provide an algorithm which, based on publicly-
available information, breaks the privacy of the voters participating in
such elections. Simulations based on real data collected in Israel show
that our algorithm performs well, and can correctly recover the vote of
up to 96% of the voters.
1 Introduction
One of the fundamental mechanisms that allow for democracy is the notion of
free elections. In free elections, eligible voters express their opinions on important
matters via voting. In liberal democracies, periodical elections (which we refer to
as “election cycles”) are held for electing the members of the governing bodies.
For people to freely express their opinions (that is, without being coerced to
external pressure), voting is usually done in a private manner. In other words,
the elections allow voters to maintain their privacy regarding their specific vote
within a large anonymity set.
One can learn about the importance of secrecy in election processes from
the Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections, published by the Inter-
Parliamentary Union in 1994,1 and which states [9]:
“2. Voting and Elections Rights:
(7) The right to vote in secret is absolute and shall not be restricted in
any manner whatsoever.”
1 The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) is an international organization of 162 state
parliaments and 10 regional parliaments. This union, which was established in 1889,
has a permanent observer status at the United Nations and general consultative
status with the Economic and Social Council.
Similarly in spirit, the state of Israel have recognized the importance of secret
voting and determined in its Basic Law: The Knesset2 [4], in Section 4 that:
“The Knesset shall be elected by general, national, direct, equal, secret,
and proportional elections, in accordance with the Knesset Elections
Law.”
In this paper, we demonstrate that only a few observations are required to breach
the privacy of the voters in the Israeli general elections. Our attack uses only the
following information: (1) the results of the elections per ballot box (which are
published at the end of the election cycle by the general elections committee);
(2) the time of vote for each voter (which is collected by the various political
parties); and (3) a periodical count of the ballots left in the tray (which can be
collected by the members of the local elections committee who are continuously
manning the ballot box). It turns out that, by collecting the above information
over several election cycles and using it to intersect the anonymity sets, it is
possible to recover most votes.
In what follows we report on simulations performed on real data from the
2013 Israeli general elections. We consider variable number of election cycles
which the adversary is acting upon and consider different time intervals by which
the adversary is able to count the ballots left in the tray. We mention that an
attack does not have to be global, and that the adversary can focus on specific
polling stations that are of interest.
We do use some assumptions in our simulations. First, we assume that an
adversary can periodically count the ballots; we elaborate on this assumption in
Section 3.1. Second, in the specific simulations reported here, we assume that
voters do not switch parties between election cycles; while this assumption is not
true for all voters, it is true for most of them (as is apparent by studying recent
election surveys [2, 19]). While this assumption somewhat weakens the results,
it is being used in the absence of sufficient real-world data about specific voters.
We further discuss our assumptions in Section 5.
Expectedly, the success of our attack increases with the number of election
cycles considered and decreases (though not dramatically) when the frequency
of the count is reduced. Our simulations demonstrate that, for example, with
only three election cycles, it is sufficient to count the ballots once in half an
hour, to recover as much as 63% of the voters. Moreover, it turns out that
we can correctly recover almost all votes, reaching 100% success in most polling
stations, and reaching 93% on the average, using six election cycles and counting
once in half an hour. Further, by counting only once in an hour, this number
remains as high as 69%.
1.1 Related Work
We briefly discuss several definitions for privacy in elections. Then, we show how
the Israeli election system can be modeled as a timed-mix, and mention several
2 The Knesset is the name of the Israeli parliament.
2
known attacks on mixes. Our attack, described in Section 3, is different from
these attacks, mainly since we use a significantly smaller number of observations.
Much of the discussion around e-voting systems evolves around their secu-
rity. However, the security is hardly ever compared to the alternative system
“that was always used”. Interestingly, although the underlying crypto is often
well understood by specialists, e-voting systems are perceived as insecure by
the layman, including decision makers. In this paper we use cryptographic tools
to study the behavior of a paper-based system, allowing to compare them on
the same field. We believe that adopting ideas from computer science and cryp-
tography to verify desirable properties of real-world paper-based elections is an
interesting research direction.
Privacy in Elections There are several definitions for privacy in elections,
most of which borrow ideas from differential privacy. In short, a voting system is
said to preserve privacy if it is impossible to distinguish between two scenarios,
differentiated by the behavior of several voters; the idea is that, if such events
are indistinguishable, then an adversary cannot infer which of them occurred in
reality. We mention several papers [6, 11, 16, 17] in this context. In this paper
we simply quantify the number of voters whose vote we could correctly de-
anonymize. We view our definition as being more natural, and, contrasted with
the available definitions—which are specifically tailored for e-voting, more suited
to the context of the current paper.
Attacks on Mixes Mixes are widely used to model private communications.
Proposed by Chaum in 1981 [7], a mix is a means for delivering messages anony-
mously between senders and receivers. Communication in a mix is split into
rounds, such that in each round n senders send messages which are then sent to
n receivers in an arbitrary or random order.
Each ballot box in the Israeli voting system can be modeled as a certain kind
of a mix, namely a timed-mix. In such a mix, a buffer of messages is mixed once
in each time period. The set of voters in each polling station corresponds to the
set of senders, while the set of parties contesting in an election corresponds to
the set of receivers. There are various known attacks on mixes [1, 10, 14, 15, 22]
and we refer the interested reader to a recent survey [18].
Most of the above-mentioned papers de-anonymize single receivers and as-
sume either a uniform distribution of the other receivers or try to approxi-
mate that distribution. In our case, the overall tally is given, and we aim to
de-anonymize the whole electorate.
1.2 Paper Organization
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief description of the Israeli
voting system. Section 3 describes our attack. In Section 4, we evaluate our attack
through simulations and discuss its tightness. In Section 5, we discuss some of
the limitations of the attack, suggest ways to overcome these limitations, discuss
possible countermeasures, and present future research directions. We conclude
the paper in Section 6.
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2 The Israeli Voting System
The Israeli voting system is described in the Knesset Elections law - 1969 [21].
In a nutshell, every eligible citizen is assigned to a polling station. In order to
vote, each voter arrives to her assigned polling station and identifies herself to
the local elections committee. The committee then crosses the voter’s name from
the list of assigned voters, and hands her a special envelope.
Fig. 1: An example of the tray for the 2013 elections.
The voter walks behind a curtain and chooses a ballot (a piece of paper with
the name of her selected party on it) from a tray, representing her preferred
party. The tray (which can be viewed in Figure 1) includes a stack of ballots
for each candidate party (34 parties contested in the 2013 elections). The voter
puts the ballot into the envelope, seals, and casts it into the ballot box, where it
mixes with all the other envelopes. The members of the local elections committee
are all, except for the chairperson, appointed by the political parties. As part
of their role these representatives periodically check behind the curtain that all
ballots are available to voters. Another informal role of the committee members
is to send the time of vote of every voter to the parties, so that the parties can
stimulate their support base who did not show up yet, for example, via phone
calls or SMS.
At the end of the elections day, the local elections committee breaks the
ballot box’s seal, opens it, extracts the ballots from each envelope, and counts
them.3 The results of the tally are then sent to the general elections committee,
which aggregates and publishes the results (including per-ballot-box statistics).
The key observation in this research is the following.
Observation 1 The size of the stack of leftover ballots “echos” the choices made
by previous voters.
3 We stress that the count is done locally, and the votes of each ballot box are not
mixed with other boxes.
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For example, if 300 ballots are placed in the tray for each of the parties at the
beginning of the election day, and 20 are missing from one stack after 20 voters
have voted (and no other ballots are missing), then an observer can conclude
that all of them voted for the party represented by this stack.
3 The Attack
In this section, we describe our attack, whose goal is to reveal the votes in Israel’s
general elections.
3.1 Collecting Observations
The adversary collects observations over several election cycles u = [1, . . . , U ].
For each election cycle, in order to collect the required observations, the adver-
sary counts all the ballots in the tray at the beginning of the elections day. We
define this count to be in time t = 0.
Then, the adversary starts counting the ballots in the tray periodically, in
times t = [1, . . . , T ]. The technical question of how the adversary can count
the stack of ballots is discussed in Section 5.1; we only mention that one might
use, for example, accurate weight scales, laser based measurement equipment, or
banknote counters. The adversary also collects the time of vote for each voter.
This information is already collected by the local elections committee, and is
sent to the parties via a dedicated form called “Tofes-1000” (which translates to
“1000-Form”).
We define a frame to be the time period between two consecutive counts.
Through their voting times, we can divide the voters into frames, and assign a
probability distribution to their vote according to the count of the respective
frame. We refer to the set of voters between the count in time t − 1 and the
count in t, in election cycle u, as V u,t, and refer to the probability distribution
associated with this time frame as Cu,t. Notice that we have t frames: frame 1 to
frame t. The probability distribution Cu,t can be represented as a vector, such
that each element in it corresponds to a party p, and each value in it is equal to
the number of ballots of party p which are missing from the stack in this frame,
normalized by the total number of voters in the frame. For example, if in the
second elections Alice voted for the party named Meretz between time t = 5 and
time t = 6, then we have that the set V 2,5 contains Alice and C2,5[Meretz] > 0.
It follows that, initially, the size of the anonymity set of every voter v ∈ V u,t is
at most the number of non-zero items in Cu,t (and not the number of non-zero
items in the tally of the whole polling station).
Notice that using these frames, the adversary can recreate the real tally of
each polling station. However, the adversary can also directly collect the real
tally of each polling station, since this information is published by the central
elections
Indeed, from the perspective of each voter, every election cycle is composed
of exactly one frame to which she belongs and an arbitrary number of frames to
which she does not belong.
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3.2 The Attack Algorithm
Our algorithm is composed of the following three functions.
– The Find Homogeneous Frames function iterates over all frames, search-
ing for homogeneous ones, i.e., frames in which all voters voted for the same
party. If such a frame is found, then all voters in it are assigned to this party,
the size of the frame is subtracted from the tally of that party, and the voters
in the frame are removed from all other frames they participate in.
– The Find Single Option Voters function iterates over all voters. For each
voter, it intersects the frames in which it participates, to find which parties
are shared by all involved frames. If only a single party is shared between all
frames in which a voter participates, then it assigns this party to the voter.
The tally for this party is then reduced by 1 and the corresponding frame
counts are updated.
– The Likelihood Estimation function iterates over tuples of (voter, party,
frame). For each such tuple, it estimates, independently for each frame, the
likelihood that a voter in the frame voted for each of the parties involved in
that frame. The likelihood is calculated as the number of votes which the
party got in this frame over the number of voters in this frame. The likeli-
hood for a voter to vote for a certain party is the product of the respective
probabilities in all frames she participated in. The output of this function is
a matrix L where each row v is a voter, and each column p is a party. An
element Lv,p in this table is the likelihood that a voter v voted for a party
p. We search for the pair (v, p) giving the largest value Lv,p and assign the
voter v to the party p. The tally is then decreased by one for that party p
and the corresponding frame counts are updated.
The attack algorithm is composed of two phases: the safe phase and the un-
safe phase. In the safe phase we call Find Homogeneous Frames and
Find Single Option Voters over and over until no new assignments can be made.
This phase is safe in the sense that whenever the algorithm assigns a party to a
voter, this assignment is necessarily correct. In other words, it can either return
the right party for a voter, or output a symbol indicating that it was unable
to de-anonymize her. In Section 4, we present the success rate of the algorithm
when only this phase is being used.
In the unsafe phase, which we invoke after no more voters can be de-anonymized
through the safe phase, the Likelihood Estimation procedure is used for mak-
ing a probabilistic decision, assigning a party to a single voter for which we
are most certain about. We then start over the process of calling to Find
Homogeneous Frames and Find Single Option Voters until they can no longer
de-anonymize voters, in which case we call Likelihood Estimation again. The al-
gorithm halts when all voters have been assigned to parties. Note that during the
course of this phase, Find Homogeneous Frames and Find Single Option Voters
can err due to previous wrong guesses made by Likelihood Estimation. However,
as we will see in Section 4, although the unsafe phase can make wrong guesses,
its success probability is much higher than that of safe phase, suggesting that it
usually does not. A pseudocode of the attack is given in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Pseudocode of the attack for a certain polling station.
Input: List of voters V u,t for t ∈ [T ] and u ∈ [U ] (list of voters)
Input: Normalized frame counts Cu,t for t ∈ [T ] and u ∈ [U ] (one value per party;
sums to 1)
{Safe phase}
while progress is made do
{Find Homogeneous Frames}
for u ∈ [U ]; t ∈ [T ]; party p do
if Cu,t[p] = 1 (and thus, for each p′ 6= p, we have Cu,t[p′] = 0) then
assign all voters in V u,t to p and decrease the tally of p by |V u,t|
end if
end for
{Find Single Option Voters}
for voter v do
if ∩u∈[U ],t∈[T ],v∈V u,t{p : Cu,t > 0} = {p} then
assign v to p, decrease the tally for p by one, and update Cu,t
end if
end for
end while
{Unsafe phase}
while not all votes have been extracted do
{Likelihood Estimation}
for voter v; party p do
compute likelihood of v voting for p as Lv,p = Πu∈[U ],t∈[T ],v∈V u,tC
u,t[p]
end for
let v′ and p′ be the pair for which the likelihood value Lv
′,p′ is maximal
assign v′ to p′, decrease the tally for p by one, and update Cu,t
while progress is made do
{Find Homogeneous Frames}
for u ∈ [U ]; t ∈ [T ]; party p do
if Cu,t[p] = 1 (and thus, for each p′ 6= p, we have Cu,t[p′] = 0) then
assign all voters in V u,t to p and decrease the tally of p by |V u,t|
end if
end for
{Find Single Option Voters}
for voter v do
if ∩u∈[U ],t∈[T ],v∈V u,t{p : Cu,t > 0} = {p} then
assign v to p, decrease the tally for p by one, and update Cu,t
end if
end for
end while
end while
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4 Evaluation of the Attack
In this section we evaluate, through simulations, the success rate of the attack
proposed in Section 3. The model considered here assumes that voters do not
change their minds between election cycles. We defer the justification of this
assumption to Section 5. We also assume, for the sake of simplicity, that voters
always vote in the same polling station, and that no new voters join or leave the
registry.
4.1 Simulations
To calculate the success rate of the attack, we ran simulations based on the
results of the 2013 general elections in Israel as published by the general elections
committee [20]. In these elections, Israel’s eligible voters were divided into 9879
polling stations. The law upper-bounds the maximal number of eligible voters
assigned to a polling station at 900; in practice, the maximal number of voters
assigned to a polling station was 894, and the median number of voters assigned
to each polling station was 590. The voting turnout was low, and out of the
5,654,842 eligible voters only 3,617,857 (64%) actually voted; as a result, the
median number of actual voters per polling station was 366. Out of these, a
total number of 3,579,793 votes were counted as legitimate votes.4
We model each polling station independently of all other polling stations, as
we see no dependencies between different polling stations.5 The published results
include, per polling station, the number of assigned voters, the number of voters
who arrived, the number of legitimate votes, the number of votes received by
each party per polling station, and an accumulated turnout rate per two hours.
Due to obvious reasons we do not have the real data needed to actually run
the attack, although we do use real data from the tallies of the various polling
stations. We therefore resort to the “second-best” option and use a simulation
of the elections process. We denote the number of voters in the attacked polling
station by n and set the number of frames T to be either 30, 15, or 7: for the vast
majority of the polling stations, this corresponds to counting the ballots once in
half an hour, an hour, or two hours.6 We created n “virtual” voters, and split
them randomly over the frames according to the turnout rate. For each frame we
“counted” the number of missing ballots, and built the voting distribution for
it. This procedure is repeated U times, corresponding to U consecutive election
cycles; we chose U = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}.
4 Absentee votes (that is, voters who do not vote in their assigned ballot, such as diplo-
mats, soldiers, and seamen), which account to about 5% of the votes, are excluded
for simplicity.
5 This independence implies that an adversary can focus their effort on subsets of
polling stations which are of interest, or where they expect to achieve a high success
rate.
6 When T = 7 the first count is done after 3 hours.
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Table 1: Average success rate of the attack, for T = 30, for extracting the exact
party that the voters voted for, and the political group that the voters belong to.
The baseline is 38% for extracting the party and 54% for extracting the group.
Election cycles safe phase unsafe phase, party unsafe phase, group
2 7% 46% 59%
3 19% 63% 73%
4 35% 76% 83%
5 50% 84% 89%
6 62% 90% 93%
7 71% 93% 96%
4.2 Results
We begin by reporting and analyzing our results, where we set T to be 30. Later
we report on simulations done with T = 15 and T = 7.
Average success rate The average success rate of the attack (over the polling
stations) is provided in Table 1. The baseline is the success rate had the adversary
always assigned the largest party or political group to all voters of the ballot box.
When trying to recover the political group that a voter voted for we first
let the algorithm assign a party to the voter and count it as a success if this
party is part of the correct group. Since the safe phase cannot output incorrect
assignments, the success rates do not change for that phase. In contrast, we can
see in the table that for the unsafe phase, the success rate increases in all cases.
The more natural course, where we first merge the parties into political
groups and then run the algorithm with 6 “virtual” parties, was tried but offered
inferior results compared with the selected approach. Consider the following sce-
nario: a voter v1 voted for party 1 and shares a frame in u = 2 with a voter
v2 who voted for party 2 and in u = 3 with a voter v3 who voted for party 3.
Assume that parties 2 and 3 are of the same political group. Now, before merg-
ing them we could exclude parties 2 and 3 as possible parties for v1. This is no
longer possible after the merge as v2 and v3 are indistinguishable.
Size and homogeneity For a more detailed understanding of the factors which
affect our success rate, we provide further results. Specifically, We show the suc-
cess rate of the attack as a function of the polling station size, and the homo-
geneity of the polling station (the homogeneity of a polling station is defined to
be the standard deviation of its normalized tally with respect to the unanimous
vector, i.e., the squared root of the squared difference between the frame and a
frame where all parties got the same number of votes, normalized by the number
of voters), both for the safe phase of the algorithm and for the unsafe phase of
the algorithm, for U = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} election cycles.
Further, we consider the attack as trying to reveal either (1) the exact party
for which the voters voted for, or (2) the political group for which the voters voted
for. Specifically, the political parties in Israel, as of 2013, can be grouped into
six almost distinct groups: left (Meretz and HaAvoda), right (Habait Hayehudi,
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Likud, and Otzma Leisrael), center7 (Eretz Chadasha, Kadima, Or, Yesh-Atid,
and Hatnuaa), ultra orthodox Jews (Yahadut Hatora, Am Shalem, and Shas),
Arabs (Balad, Hatikva-Leshinui, Chadash, Raam, and Daam), and MISC (all the
other parties, all of which do not meet the election threshold for representation).
The corresponding figures are given in Figures 2, 3, and 4. In those graphs, we
show results for U = {2, 3, 4, 5}, and do not visualize the results for U = {6, 7},
to not clutter the image too much, and since the point is already clear with those
values.
Fig. 2: Results for the safe phase, showing the success rate as a function of the
size (left) and the party (right), when extracting each voter’s party.
Fig. 3: Results for the unsafe phase, showing the success rate as a function of the
size (left) and the party (right), when extracting each voter’s party.
Results Analysis There are several important variables which affect our suc-
cess rate. First, as one might expect, using more election cycles (that is, increas-
ing U), or aiming at finding only the political group for which the voters voted
for, increases the success rate of the algorithm. Second, the unsafe phase indeed
increases the success rate of the attack, however at the cost of sometimes making
wrong decisions and assigning wrong parties to some voters.
7 Sometimes referred to as “secular”.
10
Fig. 4: Results for the unsafe phase, showing the success rate as a function of the
size (left) and the political group (right), when extracting each voter’s political
group.
Table 2: Pearson correlation between the polling station’s size and homogeneity
to the success rate for extracting the exact party of voters, using the safe phase.
size homogeneity
2 election cycles −0.56 0.29
3 election cycles −0.70 0.17
4 election cycles −0.76 0.09
5 election cycles −0.76 0.01
The other two important variables are the size of the polling station and the
homogeneity of the polling station. Specifically, it is apparent that the strongest
factor on our success rate is the size of the polling station. Indeed, we see that
the polling station’s size and the success rate are highly correlated; concretely,
the smaller the polling station is, the higher the success rate.
Less strong than the size of the polling station, the homogeneity of the polling
station is an important factor on the success rate of the algorithm. (Recall that
we measure the homogeneity of a polling station as the standard deviation of its
normalized tally.) Specifically, it seems that the more homogeneous the polling
station is, the better the attack performs. Interestingly, the correlation is de-
creasing as we consider more election cycles.
The opposing trends of these correlations suggest that, as the number of
considered election cycles grow, the importance of the homogeneity decreases in
favor of the size of the polling station which becomes more prominent.
For validation, the Pearson correlation between the polling station’s size and
the success rate, and the polling station’s homogeneity and the success rate, are
given in Tables 2 and 3 when considering the safe phase, the unsafe phase when
the exact party is extracted, and the unsafe phase when the political group is
extracted.
Importantly, the size of the polling station seems to be not correlated with
its homogeneity (in fact, the Pearson correlation between these two variables is
as low as 0.04).
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Table 3: Pearson correlation between the polling station’s size and homogeneity
to the success rate for extracting the exact party of voters and the political
group, using the unsafe phase. Each cell contains two numbers, the first of which
corresponds to the exact party while the second corresponds to the political
group.
size homogeneity
2 election cycles −0.64, −0.36 0.57, 0.81
3 election cycles −0.81, −0.62 0.30, 0.56
4 election cycles −0.83, −0.70 0.16, 0.38
5 election cycles −0.80, −0.70 0.05, 0.27
Table 4: Average success rate of the attack, for extracting the exact party that
the voters voted for, and the political group that the voters belong to, for T = 15
and T = 7, that is, when counting 15 times a day and 7 times a day.
Election cycles safe phase unsafe phase, party unsafe phase, group
T = 15, T = 7 T = 15, T = 7 T = 15, T = 7
3 3%, 0.6% 41%, 30% 55%, 46%
4 5%, 0.9% 47%, 33% 60%, 49%
5 7%, 1.2% 53%, 36% 65%, 51%
6 9%, 1.4% 59%, 38% 69%, 53%
7 12%, 1.6% 63%, 41% 72%, 54%
4.3 Further Experiments
In this section, we report on results of our simulations with varying interval
times for counting the ballots. Specifically, the results from the previous section
were for T = 30, corresponding (for almost all polling stations) to counting the
ballots once in half an hour. Next, in Table 4, we report the average success rate
of the attack (over the polling stations) for T = 15 and T = 7, corresponding
(for almost all polling stations) to counting the ballots once in an hour and once
in two hours.
5 Discussion
In this section, we begin by briefly discussing various methods for counting the
ballots and the time intervals by which an adversary is able to perform those
counts. We continue by discussing some consequences of our research. Then,
we discuss countermeasures which can be taken in order to guard the system
against attacks as the one described in this paper. Finally, we discuss possible
ways of extending our attack when we allow voters to change their minds between
election cycles.
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5.1 Counting the Ballots
The question of how exactly to count the ballots is somehow beyond the scope
of the current paper, however, we do mention some methods bellow, which seem
to be sufficient for our needs. As examples, one might use accurate weight scales;
one might use laser-based measurement equipment; or one might use banknote
counters.
Notice that, during election day, members of the polling station committee
are allowed, and encouraged, to go behind the curtains once in a while to check
that all parties have sufficient ballots.
We remark also that there is no need for a nation-wide systematic attack, as
the polling stations are independent of each other, and it is sufficient to perform
the attack on each polling station on its own, thus allowing to focus the efforts
on high priority polling stations.
5.2 Putting the Results in Context
We now give examples for countries where a similar voting system is being used
and discuss possible consequences in their context.
Our first example is Algeria [13] where the young democracy is still struggling
with conducting free elections. During the elections there have been numerous
reports about voting-related violence and it is not unreasonable to believe that
voting for the “wrong” candidate may put someone under physical danger.
Even in less extreme cases such as Israel, there may be unwanted reper-
cussions such as government-led investments made to prefer some voters over
others. This has been more prominent in the early years of Israel, where better
rations where given to members of Mapai, the ruling party at the time. Such
blunt favoritism has been long abolished now but even today the phenomenon of
voting-contractors still exists; a voting-contractor is a person having the power
to tell a large group of people how to vote. The power of a voting-contractor is
determined by the number of people they can enlist. It is very hard nowadays
for a party to contest without soliciting such voting-contractors and this activity
is not even being conducted in secret anymore.
Finally, even in countries where the government is unlikely to act dubiously
such as Sweden [5] there may still be social consequences for not voting as
everybody else in the village. Finally, we mention Spain [12] and France [8]
as two further countries where similar voting systems are used.
5.3 Countermeasures
In this section, we briefly present possible countermeasures for the attack. The
most obvious countermeasure is switching to cryptographically secure voting
systems. Such systems are not only better understood than traditional ones, but
they also allow to quantify the security loss in various scenarios.
Should a paper based system is still desired, we note that the weakness of
the system comes from the fact that the stack of tickets available to the voters
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“remembers” all previous choices. This weakness can be avoided by changing
the ballot to a one that requires the voter to choose an item from a closed list
printed beforehand; consider, for example, the ballots used in most countries of
the EU. An additional advantage of such a ballot is that it allows the voters to
rely a more complex decision (for example, reordering the members of the list
as done in Europe, or moving the vote to another party as done in Australia).
Another improvement that can be introduced into the system is to not allow
any information to leave the polling station. The current law in Israel already
disallows any form of radio communication. Extending the law to prevent any
transfer of information but the tally outside the polling station (both during
and after the elections), would make processing such information illegal for third
parties, moving our attack from the “gray area” to the black.
Finally, as the obligation to conduct fair elections is the role of the govern-
ment, it may be useful to develop a mathematical model that will take both
heterogeneity and polling stations’ sizes to help decision makers to reassign vot-
ers to voting precincts.
5.4 Allowing Voters to Switch Parties Between Election Cycles
The whole purpose of holding elections is to allow people to change the compo-
sition of the governing bodies. The reason we assume that voters do not change
their behavior is made for the sake of simplicity. We can loosen this restric-
tion completely and allow each voter to choose the party she votes for in every
election cycle, even uniformly at random. This would be, however, too extreme,
since most voters do not tend to change their viewpoints dramatically between
election cycles.
Intuitively, in a multi-partied system, a voter who voted for party p in one
elections cycle will probably vote for a party ideologically close to p in the suc-
cessive cycles. There is actually some concrete evidence supporting the above
intuition, as we discuss next.
Indeed, by analyzing election surveys provided by the Israel National Election
Studies [2, 19], we found out that roughly 50% of the voters did not change their
vote between the 2009 and the 2013 elections (this number becomes roughly 60%
if we count the successor of a party as not necessarily the one which inherited
its name, but the one which is ideologically closest.8.
Moreover, when groups of parties are being considered, the change is insignif-
icant. In fact, the change in the political map between the 2015 and the 2013
elections was that only a one seat (corresponding to 0.83% of the elected seats)
moved between the groups. These numbers mean that we can simply run our
attack without accounting for voters which change their minds, and we expect
to preserve a fairly high success rate. Moreover, one could take such information
into account; we next discuss one possible way of doing so.
8 Due to the somewhat unstable political system of Israel, a large amount of people
cannot find their political home in any of the existing parties, and tend to vote
in every elections cycle to a newly “trending” party. Moreover, parties often split,
merge, or change their names.
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In our attack, instead of computing the likelihood of each voter to vote for a
specific party in all election cycles, we can compute the likelihood of each voter
to vote for a list of different parties (one element per each election cycle); then,
given the information encoded in the transition matrices, we can multiply each
likelihood by the ‘global‘ likelihood of such a vote.
We were not able to perform simulations for such scenarios since we do not
have the real votes of voters across election cycles. That is, while we have the
tallies for each election cycle, we can not infer the real turnover, i.e., which votes
correspond to which voters in different election systems.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Free elections are an essential element in modern liberal democracies. In this
paper, we presented a way to attack the Israeli voting system (as well as several
other similar systems), showing that it is possible to recover the votes of voters in
this system. Specifically, this is possible using a very small amount of additional
public information, which includes the results of the elections, the time of vote
per voter, and a periodical count of the ballots from the tray.
We would like to end with some ideas for future research and extensions of
this attack. First, since the attack assigns voters to the parties they voted for, it
sounds reasonable that, using flow techniques (which are successfully being used
for assignment problems), we might improve the success rate of the attack. Sec-
ond, since the safe phase of the attack is based on evaluating constraints on the
possible parties for which each voter might have voted for, it sounds reasonable
that using constraint satisfaction techniques might improve the success rate of
the attack.
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